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BASIC DESERT AND REACTIVE EMOTIONS
ZAC COGLEY
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY
NORTHERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
REASSIGNED TIME AWARD ABSTRACT
SEPT 14, 2012
It is common for philosophers to invoke the idea that someone deserves an
emotion like anger because she has done something morally wrong. While appeals to this
notion of desert are common in the literature, such references aren’t thoroughly examined.
For example, what do we mean when we say that someone deserves anger because she
wronged us? This question is important because it is common for one philosopher to
claim that someone deserves anger for a moral wrong while another denies it. Without an
account of desert claims it is difficult to evaluate which position is more plausible.
We can make headway if we expand upon a claim I have defended in other work:
emotions serve three interrelated psychological functions. Emotions function to appraise
the conduct of others, to communicate that appraisal to their targets, and to sanction or
reward their targets for acting well or ill. In the paper I hope to complete with Reassigned
Time support, I will argue that these psychological functions underwrite three different
ways in which emotions like anger can be deserved. They can be deserved as accurate
appraisals, tenable communications, and credible sanctions. I will demonstrate the
differences between these functions and apply them to shed light on the considerations
that impact someone’s deservingness.
The upshot of the piece is a new theory of emotional desert that explicates a
notion that many thought intractable and enlightens our practices of holding each other
responsible—as well as the considerations relevant to forgiving each other.
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Introduction
Last year, I received a Reassigned Time Award to write a book chapter, “The Three-Fold
Significance of the Blaming Emotions.” The award was incredibly helpful and fruitful; my
chapter is now forthcoming as part of a new book series from Oxford University Press, Oxford
Studies in Agency and Responsibility. I was also able to bring the research supported by the
Reassigned Time Award to bear in the design of my current Honors 211 course: Philosophy and
Psychology of Emotion. This year I propose to use NMU’s Reassigned Time Award to complete
an article on “Basic Desert and Reactive Emotions,” which builds upon my previous writing and
extends one of my current research projects.
Let me introduce the project with a short vignette: It’s the middle of your tenure year.
You submitted your documents early with everything in good order and you sailed through the
departmental review; you’re starting to believe that you will succeed. One day, however, the
dean tells you that while the departmental evaluation as a whole was excellent, one of your
colleagues has independently written the dean against your promotion. In your colleague’s letter
there are numerous unfounded and false allegations: plagiarism, failing to hold required office
hours, and even copying lecture notes from Wikipedia.
This fictional anecdote brings out our sense that when someone does something morally
wrong, we often feel she deserves an emotional response in the form of anger or some other
reactive emotion. This sense of desert is sometimes termed basic desert and has become
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enormously important in the moral responsibility literature (Zimmerman 1988; Scanlon 1998;
Pereboom 2001; Bennett 2002; Strawson 2002; Sommers 2007; Pereboom 2008; Pereboom
2009; McKenna 2012). While there has been significant attention to arguments about whether
people deserve anger or some other reactive emotion for what they do, just what we mean when
we say that such a reactive emotion is deserved (or not) is unclear.
This is problematic because there are situations where philosophers disagree about
whether people deserve anger. Suppose, for example, you found out that your colleague was
being treated for severe depression and other psychological problems that are impeding his
ability to make good judgments. Would he still be deserving of your anger? Recently
philosophers have debated whether or not people diagnosed with psychopathy are deserving of
anger for moral wrongs they do (Wolf 1987; Shoemaker 2007; Talbert 2008; Talbert 2011;
Shoemaker 2011). It is very hard to see what reasons could be brought to bear in settling such
disputes without an account of desert for anger and other reactive emotions.
I believe we can make headway in addressing these issues by further developing a thesis
that I defend in my recent work on emotion (Cogley Forthcoming A; Cogley Forthcoming B):
emotions like anger have multiple psychological functions. My aim in the paper I propose to
complete with help from a Reassigned Time Award is to rely on the argument about
psychological functions to give an account of when emotions can be deserved. I argue that the
psychological functions of emotions correspond to three related, but distinct, moral aims:
appraisal, communication, and sanction. Each of these is demonstrated by other things we often
take to be deserved: grades, retorts, and sanctions. I think we can shed light on when and how
reactive emotions can be deserved by discussing the aims of grading, retorting, and sanctioning.
Grades we primarily take to be deserved or undeserved in virtue of their appraising role, retorts
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are deserved as more or less tenable communications, and sanctions and rewards are deserved in
virtue of being credible marks of acts as wrongful or beneficient.
Consider the idea that reactive emotions like anger are appraisals (Parkinson 1997). An
appraisal is a person’s evaluation or interpretation of a situation. Since reactive emotions are
appraisals, they can be appropriate or inappropriate depending on whether or not their appraisal
is accurate. By analogy, consider the grade deserved by a paper that shows significant confusion
about the topic and doesn’t manage to develop a coherent thesis. The writing is too hurried and
there are numerous grammatical mistakes. Underlying your assessment that the paper doesn’t
deserve an ‘A’ but does deserve a ‘C’ is that accurately appraising student work is the point of
assigning discrete grades. A similar observation connecting appraisal and desert applies to
reactive emotions. Such emotions are deserved if they accurately reflect the quality of someone’s
action. Return to the above story about your diabolical colleague who appears to be trying to
sabotage your promotion out of ill will. There’s an obvious sense in which, if you’re going to
feel any reactive emotion toward your collage at all, it’s anger, not gratitude, that he deserves.
Similarly, it would be shockingly inappropriate if you felt happy about what your colleague had
done, rather than angry or indignant.
This is a sketch of how I plan to analyze desert claims in light of different aims of the
reactive emotions. My project of explicating what it is for a reactive emotion to be deserved will
fill a significant hole in the literature on moral responsibility, as there has been little attention to
what it means to say that emotions like anger are deserved. I also anticipate that my account will
shed light on situations where we’re conflicted about whether someone deserves a reactive
emotion. I will argue that expressed reactive emotions usually serve all three of the aims but that
in some situations a reactive emotion can be deserved in once sense but not in another. For
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example, I will analyze what has become known as “The Paradox of Forgiveness” (Hieronymi
2001; Griswold 2007; Lucy Allais 2008; L. Allais 2008a; L. Allais 2008b; Zaibert 2009;
Warmke): the feeling that in one sense a wrongdoer who begs our forgiveness still deserves our
anger, and in another sense she does not. I will argue this ambiguity results from the fact that
resentment would still accurately appraise the wrongdoer’s action as wrongful, but there is no
longer any moral reason to communicate the resentment to her if she has already acknowledged
fault for what she did.
This project on basic desert and reactive emotions will culminate in an approximately
8,000-word article I hope will be included in a special issue of a volume of Philosophical
Explorations dedicated to basic desert, edited by two highly influential philosophers, Derk
Pereboom and Maureen Sie. If I am granted Reassigned Time for the Winter term, I will be able
to complete a draft of the chapter by the mid-semester recess, with the hope of having two
months for revisions and edits before the final submission. This project will significantly
advance my ongoing research program into emotions and moral responsibility, raise the status of
NMU’s Philosophy Department professionally, and allow me to continue using my research to
develop and augment new courses, as I did with my Honors course this term, which benefits both
the Philosophy Department and the College of Arts and Sciences.

Methods
My interdisciplinary methodology—Psychological and Biological Realism—assumes
that the correct philosophical accounts of morality and other distinctively human concepts must
be based on what human beings are actually like. As human nature is investigated in many
overlapping fields from many diverse perspectives, I must stay current in the literature in
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biology, psychology, sociology, and philosophy, among others. This requires an enormous
amount of attention to developments in these disciplines, especially empirical psychology, where
new work on the emotions and morality is generated almost daily. A Reassigned Time Award
will thus help ensure that I have time to continue my interdisciplinary inquiries by allowing me
time to read new articles in all these fields, write summaries of them, and incorporate their
insights into my own research.
As my methods bring philosophical scrutiny to bear on relevant sociological
psychological, and biological research, I will not need any special equipment other than my
current NMU resources: my office, computer, and library access.

Reassigned Time
To ensure the successful timely completion of this project, I request a 4-credit release for
the Winter semester. Teaching a full three-course load this Winter would pose significant
challenges given the time-sensitive nature of this undertaking. I prefer not to balance my high
standards for teaching against the demands of this research project. Four credits of reassigned
time will ensure that I can stay true to my commitment to discussion-based learning in the
classes I teach while at the same time completing this significant project.
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ZAC COGLEY WINTER 2011 REASSIGNED TIME AWARD REPORT
Overview
This report covers my NMU Reassigned Time Award for the Winter term of 2011.
During that term, I received a one-course class reduction; my colleague Sarah Jones
taught the section of PL180: Fundamentals of Ethical Theory that I had been assigned to
teach.
My Reassigned Time Award was incredibly beneficial for the advancement of my
own research and writing; because of it, I was able to write a book chapter on the virtue
of Patience and the corresponding vice of Wrath that will be included in an upcoming
collection under contract with Oxford University Press on philosophical accounts of
individual virtues and vices. Oxford University Press anticipates a full draft of the book
to be completed in 2012, with publication to follow that year or the next. I did not seek
outside grants during my term of reassigned time as the NMU grant provided the
necessary time and funds to complete my chapter.
Results
Patience and Wrath are generally thought to be the virtue and vice with respect to
anger. My work on this project is an extension of research I first undertook in my
dissertation, where I developed a philosophical account of anger that I brought to bear on
the problem of free will. For my chapter, I did additional research in empirical
psychology and philosophical work on the virtues. Drawing on this research, I argued
that virtue and vice in anger is determined by excellence or deficiency along three
functions that anger serves in human psychology: appraisal, motivation, and
communication.
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While there has been some recent attention to angry virtue and vice in the
philosophical literature, most contemporary accounts of virtue in anger allow angry virtue
to be determined by only one of the three functions that anger serves. So, for example,
Macalester Bell (2009) holds that virtue in anger is determined only by how appropriate
someone’s anger is: essentially, does a person get very angry at significant injustices and
less angry at minor slights? Others, like Lisa Tessman (2005), argue that virtue in anger
is determined only by how motivated the angry person is to resist injustice and promote
the flourishing of others.
In my chapter, I show that this focus on one function of anger to the exclusion of
others fails to accurately characterize virtue in anger by using the examples of Frederick
Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr. Both Douglass and King are thought to be
exemplars of virtue, so their example helps me to demonstrate that virtue in anger
requires both getting very angry at major injustices and at the same time being motivated
to combat them. Douglass and King were both incensed by the treatment of blacks in the
United States and were motivated to tirelessly oppose such treatment. So the proper
account of virtue in anger requires attention to both anger’s appropriateness and the sort
of motivations the angry person has. The examples of Douglass and King also help me
emphasize that another important function of anger is communication: an excellently
angry person urges others to become angry at injustice or wrongful conduct and tries to
motivate them to resist the injustice or wrong, just as both Douglass and King did through
powerful and inspiring speeches.
Part of the reason that Douglass and King are moral exemplars, then, is that they
possessed excellence in anger with respect to appraisal, motivation, and communication.
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Excellence along all three dimensions is constitutive of virtue in anger. Viciousness in
anger, on the other hand, is characterized by excessiveness or deficiency along all three
dimensions. For example, the wrathful person gets angry when it is inappropriate and is
angrier than the situation warrants. He acts aggressively and impulsively toward others
and is quick to communicate his excessive anger. The moral danger of wrath is thus
moral overconfidence and moral insensitivity. The threat of the wrathful person’s anger
often discourages others from legitimately challenging his authority. This can lead to him
growing in overconfidence and insensitivity—wrath can thus enter into an increasingly
vicious cycle with pride (Taylor 2006).
I am incredibly grateful for the Reassigned Time Award for providing me the
time to advance my research outside the philosophical literature into current
psychological research on the emotions. This was very helpful in grounding and
advancing my philosophical thinking, and in helping to produce a chapter that, while
maintaining its philosophical strength, also demonstrates a commitment to
interdisciplinary thought and research. I was also able to use some of the fruits of my
research to develop and offer a new class: Philosophy and Psychology of Emotion. I very
much value the opportunity to share the fruits of my research with NMU students and I
am committed to continuing to do so in the future.

Further Directions
While I continue to revise and revisit my thinking about vice and virtue with
respect to anger, my philosophical and psychological research on anger and other
emotions leads in several promising directions. Here I highlight just one. I am
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particularly interested in exploring the connection between emotions like anger and
certain moral concepts, like moral responsibility. My view is that we can understand
more about moral responsibility and thereby have a greater appreciation of the conditions
under which it is appropriate to hold people morally responsible if we have a greater
understanding of emotions, like anger, that I believe help to shape our concept of moral
responsibility. If anger has several different psychological functions, that should mean
that moral responsibility is a concept with several functions as well. I hope to explore the
implications of this thesis in future work.
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Overview
This report covers my NMU Reassigned Time Award for the Winter term of 2012. During that
term, I received a one-course class reduction; my colleague Sarah Jones taught the section of PL180:
Fundamentals of Ethical Theory that I had been assigned to teach.
My Reassigned Time Award was highly beneficial for the advancement of my own research
and writing; because of it, I was able to complete a paper on “The Three-Fold Significance of the
Blaming Emotions” that will be included in an upcoming volume under contract with Oxford
University Press: Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. The collection has been sent out for
external review and should be published late this year or the next. I did not seek outside grants
during my term of reassigned time as the NMU grant provided the necessary time and funds to
complete my paper. However, without the award, there is no question that I would have been
unable to complete the paper. The Reassigned Time Award was thus indispensible for helping to
advance my research. The Award also allowed me to continue to balance my commitment to
teaching with the advancement of my own scholarship.
Results
Many philosophers working on moral responsibility follow P.F. Strawson (1982) in thinking that we
should understand claims about someone’s moral responsibility or the phenomenon of holding
someone morally responsible in terms of the appropriateness of a certain class of emotions (Bennett
1980; Watson 1993; Wallace 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; McKenna 1998; Macnamara 2009).
But even those who do not follow Strawson in identifying moral responsibility attributions with the
appropriateness of emotions hold that emotions do play a role in our moral responsibility practices
(Scanlon 2008, 143). In spite of this, the significance of the blaming emotions for moral
responsibility has been under-theorized.
In order to fully appreciate the import of the blaming emotions for moral responsibility we
need a more adequate moral psychology. As an initial step, my work appeals to recent psychology of
emotion to argue that the blaming emotions—anger, resentment, and indignation—are significant
for our moral responsibility practices in three different ways. They are important to moral
responsibility in appraising people as acting wrongfully, in communicating the appraisal to perceived
wrongdoers, and in sanctioning people who are appraised as wrongful. I also investigate the conditions
of appropriateness of the blaming emotions.
My analysis is also inspired by the fact that although there has been significant recent
attention to the concept of moral responsibility, there is little agreement about it. Indeed, in one
recent attempt to clear the conceptual territory, John Martin Fischer and Neal Tognazzini argue that
there are up to thirteen different analytical or conceptual ‘stages’ of moral responsibility attributions,
organized (roughly) into two broad categories: attributibility and accountability (2010).
I am deeply sympathetic to the project of achieving clarity about our conception of moral
responsibility as it is central to making progress on some of our most vexing issues, including
whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. However, I fear that some recent
attempts to introduce clarity risk further confusion because they have not paid sufficient attention to
the moral psychology of the blaming emotions. Not only, then, do I try to enrich our moral
psychological picture of the blaming emotions, but I also link appraisal, communication, and
sanction to representative accounts of moral responsibility. I suggest that each kind of account is

inspired by a different way in which the blaming emotions are significant, and thus each account
implicitly emphasizes a different consideration of emotional appropriateness. Fittingness accounts of
moral responsibility are linked to appraisal, moral address accounts correspond to the
communicative dimension of the blaming emotions, and desert accounts of moral responsibility are
inspired by the blaming emotions’ sanctioning role. If I am right, part of the reason debates about
moral responsibility have been so intractable is that many theorists share the assumption that
appropriate blaming emotions are a reliable indicator of a person’s moral responsibility, while
inappropriate blaming emotions are evidence of a lack of moral responsibility. This makes it appear
as if all parties to the debate are operating with the same conception of moral responsibility in mind.
However, because different accounts are implicitly linked to different kinds of appropriateness, the
wide agreement that the appropriateness of the blaming emotions is revealing of moral responsibility
obscures significant disagreements about the concept and the conditions for its application that
emerge with a more refined focus.
I am incredibly grateful for the Reassigned Time Award for providing me the time to
advance my interdisciplinary research on emotions and their philosophical significance. I believe that
many of our strongest philosophical debates are clarified with a deeper understanding of work being
done in psychology. This is demonstrated in the progress we make by paying attention to the
significance of emotions for understanding moral responsibility. The Award was incredibly helpful
in allowing me the time to produce a chapter that, while maintaining its philosophical strength,
demonstrates a commitment to interdisciplinary thought and research.
Further Directions
While I continue to revise and revisit my thinking about moral responsibility, my philosophical and
psychological research on anger and other emotions leads in several promising directions. Here I
highlight just one. I am particularly interested in exploring the connection between emotions like
anger, resentment, and indignation with other moral concepts, like desert. I believe that the
framework I have developed in this project might fruitfully be used to illuminate different senses in
which someone can be said to deserve punishment, reward, and other kinds of treatment. I hope to
explore the implications of this thesis in future work.

